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1. INTRODUCTION
As China marches into the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), Chinese intellectual property ("IP") industries have be-
gun to worry about whether they can fulfill the promises the gov-
ernment has made on their behalf to comply with the Agreement
for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") standards
embedded in China's IP legislation. Some industries, such as the
pharmaceutical industry, are concerned that the IP protection
standards set in TRIPS are too high for a developing country like
China and that compliance will mean sacrificing the interests of
China's young IP-related industries.' However, the software in-
dustry is singing a different tune regarding the protection of IP. As
a non-Chinese lawyer observed, "[M]any indigenous [software]
firms in China are yearning for better protection of their IP rights
and they may well be the strength of China's future economy." 2 A
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ford Law School, yali@hku.hk.
1 Xu Xiaoyun, Zhongguo "Rushi" Qiye ruhe yingdui: WTO Yu Zhongguo Qiye
Luntan Baodao [How Industries Face the Challenges of the WVTO], ZHONGGUO ZHIsHI
CHANQUAN BAO [CHINA INTELL. PROP.NEWS], Mar. 22,2000, at 3.
2 Andy Y. Sun, Beijing Court Dismissed Microsoft for Lack of Evidence: Major
Software End User Infringement Case in China May Return Later, 1 APLI UPDATE, Feb.
2000, at 8.
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Chinese writer, in an article opposing IP protection for software,
lamented, "Certain Chinese software companies are always mak-
ing a big commotion, saying that they have fallen behind the pack,
far behind the cutting edge of the [international software industry],
with no way to catch up, and this is entirely due to software pi-
racy," 3 and even "Bill Gates is much more tolerant [to piracy] than
our own software companies."
4
Why does the Chinese software industry have a different atti-
tude towards IP protection than other industries? In other words,
why is the Chinese software industry more receptive to IP protec-
tion than other industries? How did this preference arise, and will
the trend towards greater IP protection remain the same for the
foreseeable future? What has the Chinese software industry done
to foster this trend toward increased protection of IP and what is
the role of the government in this movement? What implications
does this trend have for the rule of law in China? More specifi-
cally, does this trend indicate that economic forces or interests will
ultimately decide the fate of the rule of law in China? As economic
reform proceeds, will the Chinese people, who have economic
stakes in protecting their own rights, be more receptive to the rules
governing their society? Will the rule of law therefore be more eas-
ily established in China? These are the issues I will explore in this
Essay.
This Essay first summarizes a theoretical debate on what de-
gree of IP protection for software is most beneficial to the growth
of China's software industry. It then surveys the development of
China's indigenous software industry to see what its strengths and
weaknesses are and how China's government and the software in-
dustry have dealt with problems plaguing the industry. Finally,
this Essay examines the implications of the industry's efforts in
pushing for greater IP protection with regards to the establishment
of the rule of law in China.
2. THE DEBATE: STRONG PROTECTION V. WEAK PROTECTION
The issue of whether stronger IP protection for software pro-
grams leads to more innovation, trade, and foreign direct invest-
ment ("FDI") in a developing country has been a hot topic among
3 Wang Xiaodong, It Is Right to Pirate Software, China and the World (Zhong-
guo yu Shijie), Nov. 1999, at 6, available at http://www.uscc.gov/itisri.pdf (last
visited Nov. 13, 2002).
4 Id. at 8.
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international IP experts. Many studies have been conducted to
find a correlation between IP protection and these benefits. Gener-
ally speaking, patents confer stronger rights than copyrights and a
patented program cannot be further developed without authoriza-
tion of the patent-holder; therefore patenting software "may block
a whole area of possible innovation."5 The United States is one of
the very few countries that uses patents to protect algorithms and
computer programs.6 However, because TRIPS does not define
what an "invention" is, member countries can liberally interpret
whether software constitutes an invention or not, and "[n]ational
legislation may exclude the patentability of computer programmes
or their constituent parts, as is the case under current law in Euro-
pean countries... ."7 China protects software under the copyright
regime, but it does not explicitly protect it as "literary work," an
issue discussed later in this Essay.
Studies carried out by Mansfield in 1993, Maskus and Eby-
Konan in 1994, and Primo Braga and Fink in 1998 found no strong
correlation between strict IP protection for software and a change
in FDI.8 China and India are two countries often cited as examples
supporting this finding.9 According to Paul Tackaberry's survey,
many foreign investors in China indicated that the "size and poten-
tial" of the market "principally attract[ed]" their investment, allow-
ing them "to put their significant concerns regarding the protection
and enforcement [of IP] to one side .... "10 The desire of many
multinational corporations to occupy the market has often out-
weighed their investors' concerns about IP protection." When
5 CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIoNs 152 (2000).
6 Id. at 134-37.
7 CARLOS MARIA CORREA, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: A GUIDE FOR THE SOUTH: THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 72 (1997).
8 KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
130 (2000) (discounting the strength of the Mansfield and Maskus/Eby-Konan
studies).
9 Horacio Teran, Intellectual Property Protection and Offshore Software Develop-
ment: An Analysis of the U.S. Software Industry, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 2
(2001) ("Countries that have a poor record of enforcement of software intellectual
property rights, such as China and India, receive overseas investments."), available
at http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/pdf/teran.pdf.
10 PAUL TAcKABERRY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RISKS IN CHINA: THEIR EFFECT ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 34 (1999).
11 Id.
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asked whether his company would invest more heavily in China if
IP protection improved, an American businessman replied:
That has nothing to do with it. We will invest in China be-
cause we feel it has a lot of potential for us. The [IP rights]
problems we have will not stop us investing.., this is a
country that represents... a huge opportunity. And we
want to be part of that.12
Bill Gates's famous remarks on why Microsoft is willing to bear
millions of dollars of losses in China are more frank:
Although about three million computers get sold every
year in China, people don't pay for the software. Someday
they will, though. And as long as they're going to steal it,
we want them to steal ours. They'll get sort of addicted,
and then we'll somehow figure out how to collect sometime
in the next decade.13
On the other hand, many investors are concerned about weak
protection in China. "Rampant piracy of intellectual property in
China has undermined foreign confidence in the Chinese market's
ability to absorb foreign technology and copyrighted material
without cannibalizing it."14 Jonathan Spierer, Chairman/CEO of
DistanceVision, Inc., explained that while "it may be a good time
for large software companies to establish themselves in the Chinese
market through relations with domestic partners and infrastruc-
ture-based projects," small foreign companies depending heavily
on one product that can be easily duplicated should wait until the
IP regulatory climate improves before introducing their product in
China.15
12 Id. at 45.
13 Sun, supra note 2, at 7. According to Andy Sun, this is "no different from
what the British did to China in the mid-19th century-i.e., first to get people ad-
dicted to opium and then to reap windfall profit with full armory in hand ...."
14 Jonathan C. Spierer, Intellectual Property in China: Prospectus for New Market
Entrants, HARV. ASIA Q., Summer 1999, at 46, available at http://www
.fas.harvard.edu/-asiactr/haq/199903/9903a010.htm.
15 Id. at 46.
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Even if foreign investors are more carefree with FDI in China,
they may also be more cautious about moving their research and
development ("R&D") centers there. In 1996, Lee and Mansfield
found that a country's weak IP protection has "a significant nega-
tive impact on the location of U.S. FDI."16 Maskus found that
many foreign enterprises are disinclined to locate R&D facilities in
China out of concern for patent infringement and misappropria-
tion.17 For example, one firm established design and engineering
centers in Singapore and Taiwan while producing and distributing
their products in China, and they declared, "[W]e won't set up any
in China unless we are sure that people in China will take en-
forcement actions seriously."18 Only a few investors like Microsoft,
who are confident and powerful enough in guarding their tech-
nologies and bearing losses, have established research institutes in
China "despite the fact that nine out of ten software copies sold in
China are pirated."'19 Most of them transfer outdated (e.g., five
years behind) technologies or technologies that will be obsolete
within a few years. Among the foreign companies surveyed in
China, forty-three percent admitted that they transfer outdated,
rather than state-of-the-art technology. 20
Thus, although strong protection of software under patent law
like in the United States may not be a good model to follow, weak
protection is even more harmful to the growth of the Chinese soft-
ware industry. It not only hurts foreign investors' confidence in
importing their latest technologies, but also harms the incentives
for and ability of the indigenous industry to further develop, an is-
sue discussed in more details below. Determining how to strike a
balance between long-term goals and short-term gains is a difficult
task for China. As Spierer pointed out, "Leaders enforcing both
national and regional Chinese laws would be well-served by ask-
ing themselves what is more important for China's future: a pirat-
ing industry capable of stealing and undercutting other firms' in-
novations or a legitimate software industry capable of competing
on an international level?" 2'
16 MAsKus, supra note 8, at 130.
17 Id. at 155.
18 TACKABERRY, supra note 10, at 39.
19 Teran, supra note 9, at 15.
20 TACKABERRY, supra note 10, at 32.
21 Spierer, supra note 14, at 51.
2002]
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3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDIGENOUS SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
The software industry is one of the fastest growing sectors in
China, with a twenty-eight percent average annual growth rate.
22
In 1984, there were only about 20,000 software designers nation-
wide, but by year 2000, the number of software industry employ-
ees had increased to 500,000, and annual sales had grown to RMB
23.5 billion (U.S. $2.85 billion).23 By May 2001, there were 30 mil-
lion Internet users in China, indicating a high demand for soft-
ware.24 Software companies, first appearing in the late 1980s,
mushroomed in the 1990s and provided 61,346 jobs and generated
U.S. $219.8 million in tax revenues in 1997 alone.25 According to a
study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, "[i]n China, few sectors of the
economy can expect to exceed the performance of the software in-
dustry."26 In Scott Kennedy's words, "[S]oftware has woven itself
into the fabric of Chinese society."
27
In the meantime, there is substantial room for further devel-
opment of the industry. For example, three million computers are
sold every year in China, but only three out of every 1000 people
own personal computers and there are only 0.2 Internet hosts for
every 10,000 people in the country.28 The software market also has
great potential for further expansion. It is estimated that China's
software exports and application development services will grow
from the current U.S. $850 million to U.S. $27 billion in 2006.29
Therefore, "[m]any software moguls have classified China as 'per-
haps the world's most interesting market.... [I]t is not only a large
22 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO
THE CHINESE ECONOMY 1 (Nov. 1998), available at http://www.bsa.org/usa
/globallib/econ/china-study98.pdf.
23 Scott Kennedy, In the Company of Markets: The Transformation of China's
Political Economy 212-13 (2002) (unpublished dissertation submitted to the Fac-
ulty of Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of the George Washington Uni-
versity) (on file with author).
24 Id. at 214.
25 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 22, at 1.
26 Id. at 1-2.
27 Kennedy, supra note 23, at 214.
28 This is a 1996 statistic. See MAsKus, supra note 8, at 72, tbl. 3.5 (illustrating
"[i]ndicators of demand for copyright products in China, the United States, India
and other countries").
29 ChinaBiz.org, China to Become Worldwide Software Player by 2006- Study,
Sept. 23, 2002, at http://www.chinabiz.org/articles/show.asp?id=1665.
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purchasing market, but also a large potential labor and entrepre-
neurial market for software development and service."
30
4. PRoBLEMS PLAGUING THE INDUSTRY
While experiencing rapid development, the Chinese software
industry also faces many serious problems, such as low sales vol-
ume, insufficient R&D input, shortage of software developers and
rampant software piracy. These problems have greatly impeded
the industry's growth.
4.1. Lack of Competitiveness
First of all, software sales in China remain substantially lower
than in other countries. For example, in 2000, total worldwide
software sales profits reached U.S. $540 billion, while Chinese sales
only totaled RMB 22.5 billion (U.S. $2.7 billion).3' While India ex-
ported U.S. $4 billion worth of software in 2000, China exported
only U.S. $1.3 million worth.32
Furthermore, China's software industry has been suffering
from "brain drain," perhaps the most serious problem facing the
industry. Human capital is vital to the competitive strength of the
software industry.33 In the United States, software firms are very
aggressive in recruiting and offer generous financial rewards to the
skilled programmers attracted there from all over the world.34 In
China, the numbers and qualifications of well-trained program-
mers simply cannot meet the demand of the nation's industry.
There are too few software programmers trained in Chinese uni-
versities and too many of those programmers are going abroad.
35
30 Spierer, supra note 14, at 50.
31 Zong Jian, Ruanjian Chanye de Shiji Huati - Yu Zhongxiao Qiye Quanli Ruan-
jianshang Yixitan [Software Enterprises' Century Talk: Interview with Software Entre-
preneurs of Small and Medium Enterprises], XINYANG RIBAO [XINYANG DAILY], Apr. 9,
2001, at 11, available at http://www.wisenews.net/wisenews-cgi/enterprise
/doc.pip?misspath=/god/raw/dtp/txt/sy-sydaily.
32 Id.
33 Teran, supra note 9, at 26.
34 Id. at 27.
35 Thirteen percent of Qinghua University graduates and twenty percent of
Beijing University graduates, students from the two best universities in China, go
abroad each year. See ZHONGGUO KEJI FAzHAN YANJIU BAOGAO YAJrUZU, [CHNA
ScIENcE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP], ZHONGGUO KEJI
FAZHAN YANJIu-KEJI QUANQIUHA JI ZHONGGUO MIANLING DE TIAozHAN [THE
2002]
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Among those who do remain in China, only very few are engaged
in local software development, as most want to be CEOs of local
firms or to form their own firms in order to make quick money
within one or two years after graduation from the universities, 36 or
to work for foreign firms.37
Many multinational corporations establish R&D units in China,
obviously for the purpose of attracting local programmers who are
highly qualified but can be paid much less than their American
counterparts. As mentioned earlier, these corporations are very
successful at recruiting qualified Chinese nationals and include
Motorola, Intel, Microsoft, and Edison.3 8
4.2. Software Piracy
Another serious problem plaguing China's software industry is
software piracy. In fact, according to a survey conducted by the
Chinese government, software piracy is the number one factor im-
peding the development of the software industry.39 It is estimated
that only four percent of the software currently used in China is le-
gitimate.40 On average, each computer owner spent only one dol-
lar on legitimate software in 1993 and 1994.41 According to a study
by the Business Software Alliance, the software piracy rates in
REPORT ON CHINA'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (2000)-THE
GLOBALIZATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGES CHINA IS
FACING] 111 (2000). Chinese universities have not offered curricula on software
development and comprehensive training materials are unavailable. As a conse-
quence, China's information technology industry is short 420,000 personnel. Re
Feng, Zhongguo de Guigu Zai Nali? [Mhere Is China's Silicon Valley?] DONG XIANG
[TREND MAG.], Mar. 2002, at 42.
36 Re Feng, supra note 35, at 42.
37 The Research Institute of Microsoft (China) employs sixty people, all
graduates from the best Chinese universities. See ZHONGGUO KEJI FAZHAN YANJIU
BAOGAO YAJIUZU, [CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
GROUP], supra note 35, at 111.
38 Id.
39 Zhongguo Ruanjian Chanye Shehui Huanjing Diaoyan Baogao Zhengshi Fabu
[The Publication of the "Survey Report on Social Environment of Chinese Software In-
dustry"], ZHONGGUO ZHISHI CHANQUAN BAO [CHINA INTELL. PROP. NEws], Sept. 15,
2000, at 1.
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China were ninety-four percent in 2000 and ninety-two percent in
2001.42 Only Vietnam had higher rates.43
Some scholars point out that piracy happens with packaged
software and because developing countries have made little pro-
gress in the production of packaged software,44 the software indus-
tries in most developing countries are "working in areas that are
not sensitive to the local level of copyright protection."45 Despite
the fact that China is a developing country lacking competitiveness
as discussed earlier, China's domestic packaged software industry
"is valued at US $1-1.5 billion and is growing at thirty-two percent
per annum."46 Therefore, piracy is a concern for China's domestic
firms as well, perhaps even more than for foreign firms. Many for-
eign observers have repeatedly pointed out that software piracy
hurts China and the Chinese software industry as much as it harms
foreign investors.47 This is because piracy of foreign software may
help to increase the market share of foreign software companies
42 International Planning and Research Corporation, Seventh Annual BSA
Global Software Piracy Study, Bus. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE 4 (2002), available at
http://- www.bsa.org/usa/policyres/admin/2002-06-10.130.pdf.
43 Id. (citing Vietnam as having a ninety-seven percent piracy rate in 2000 and
a ninety-four percent rate in 2001).
44 See Catalin Cosovanu, Piracy, Price Discrimination, and Development: The
Software Sector in Eastern Europe and other Emerging Markets 10 (2001) (unpub-
lished J.S.M. thesis, Stanford Law School) (on file with Stanford University) (ex-
plaining why piracy effects packaged software and what local software develop-
ers work on instead), available at http://www.columbia.edu/-cc2134
/Cosovanu2.pdf.
45 Id. at 13. See also CORREA, supra note 5, at 152 ("Developing countries have
a marginal role in the production of computer software. The capacity to produce
packaged software is one of the most important indicators of the degree of devel-
opment of the software industry in a particular country.").
46 Spierer, supra note 14, at 49.
47 For example, Alford points out, "[t]he most significant rationale for intel-
lectual property law lies with the welfare of the Chinese people themselves. They
are now, and seem likely in the foreseeable future to continue to be, the greatest
victims of the infringement of intellectual property that is rampant throughout
that vast nation." William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual
Property Rights, Human Rights, and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold
War World, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 147,148 (Mark A.
Cohen et al. eds., 1999). Stephanie Mitchell, Vice President of the Business Soft-
ware Alliance, explained, "The rapid development of China's own software in-
dustry depends upon full protection for software producers under the law....
[T]he fact is, piracy is a form of stealing that hurts China and Chinese software
producers as much as it hurts their foreign counterparts." Spierer, supra note 14,
at 50.
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and thus to "mak[e] it more difficult for local competitors to estab-
lish themselves" in the market.48 Piracy also makes local software
firms "unable to sell enough software to prosper."49
The views about piracy among the Chinese themselves are
mixed. Some think that, as a developing country, China should
not give software programs strong protection because the price for
authentic software far exceeds affordability for Chinese consumers.
Piracy is beneficial because it provides Chinese people with oppor-
tunities both to use the software and to learn new technologies.50
However, Xu Chao, a Deputy Director of the Copyright Admini-
stration Department of the National Copyright Administration
("NCA"), strongly objects to this view. He points out that while it
is understandable if an ordinary consumer opts for pirated soft-
ware because of its low price, it is unforgivable for people who are
responsible for enforcement of IP rights to have the same mental-
ity.S1 For local software companies, it is a matter of life or death if
piracy is not stopped. Again, piracy is by far the number one im-
pediment to the expansion of the Chinese software industries. For
example, Kingsoft, a local software firm, estimated in 1999, that
twenty million pirated copies of its word processing software were
installed on Chinese computers. The firm had sold only forty
thousand legitimate copies. 52
5. ToP-DOWN CAMPAIGNS
Knowing that software is vital to the development of a coun-
try's sciences and technologies, the Chinese government has made
48 Emily Thornton, At China's Gates: Microsoft Boss Conquers a Key Asian Mar-
ket, 159 FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 28, 1995 & Jan. 4, 1996, at 54-55, cited in
TACKABERRY, supra note 10, at 8. An associate counsel at Microsoft stated that the
company had no choice in deciding whether to market their products in China
because their "products were already in China, and they were being supplied by
software pirates." Teran, supra note 9, at 15.
49 This is a view expressed by Bo Liu, former Deputy General Manager of
Microsoft China. Bo Liu, China: Protecting the Knowledge-Based Economy and
Intellectual Property Rights, Remarks at Country Panel IV, Harvard Asia Business
Conference (Feb. 2-3, 2001) [hereinafter Harvard Asia Business Conference], at
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-asiactr/haq/200102/0102aOOlcp5.htm.
50 Wang Xiaodong, supra note 3, at 1.
51 Xu Chao, Daji Daoban Shizai Bixing [Piracy Must be Suppressed], STATE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF PRC, Nov. 20, 2001, available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/ywdt/jdlt/200111200018.htm.
52 Kennedy, supra note 23, at 253 n.54.
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conscious efforts to improve the following aspects of software pro-
tection: legislation, law enforcement, and financial assistance.
5.1. Legislative Developments
Chinese copyright law protects computer software as a
"work."53 In addition, the State Council enacted the Regulations for
the Protection of Computer Software ("Regulations") in 1991. On De-
cember 20, 2001 the State Council issued the amended Regulations,
effective as of January 1, 2002. The new Regulations made the fol-
lowing changes: (1) the protection term for software programs was
extended from twenty-five years to fifty years; (2) authors have
been granted the exclusive right to lease computer software; and
(3) judges were given discretion to award damages based on either
losses or profits, or on a statutory damage range from RMB 5,000
(U.S. $604.81) to RMB 50,000 (U.S. $6,048.07).4
It is worth noting that only foreign computer programs are
treated as "literary works," and domestic programs are not.
55 This
53 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzouquan Fa [Copyright Law of the
People's Republic of China] [hereinafter PRC Copyright Law], art. 3, Sept. 7, 1990
(China), translated in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 2000).
54 NTD Patent & Trademark Agency Ltd., Regulations for the Protection of
Computer Software, 43 NTD NEWSLETrER (Mar. 2002), at http://us.chinantd.com/e-
newsl-43.html#en43-3.
The Regulations [also] specifically provide that anyone who commits any
of the following acts that infringes [sic] the rights of [a] software copy-
right owner shall bear corresponding civil or criminal liability: (1) Re-
producing or partly reproducing a piece of software without the consent
of the software copyright owner; (2) Distributing, renting and transmit-
ting on [the] information network to the public a piece of software with-
out the consent of the software copyright owner; (3) Intentionally evad-
ing or destroying the technical measures that are taken by the software
copyright owner to protect its software; (4) Intentionally deleting or
changing the electronic information of [a] software copyright; (5) Assign-
ing or licensing others to exploit [a] software copyright without the con-
sent of the software copyright owner.
Id.
.55 Article 7 of Implementation of the International Copyright Treaties pro-
vides that "[f]oreign computer programs shall be protected as literary works, shall
not be subject to registration and shall enjoy a term of protection of fifty years
commencing from the end of the year of their first publication." Implementation
of the International Copyright Treaties, art. 7, Sept. 30, 1992 (China), translated in
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 2000). But TRIPS Article
10(1) required that computer programs be protected as "literary work." Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
2002]
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is arguably a discrimination against local software developers be-
cause a "literary work" can receive copyright protection without
going through any formalities such as registration.56 On June 24,
2000, the State Council issued Several Policies for the Encouragement
of the Development of Software and Integrated Circuit Industries, also
known as Document No. 18, to "encourage the registration of
software copyright, and provide strengthened protection for regis-
tered software according to the national law."57 The objective of
the Document is to "place present and future national priority on
the development of the IT industry, especially the software and in-
tegrated circuit industries .... -58 However, the emphasis on regis-
tration of software programs seems to have undermined this objec-
tive. Xu Chao explained that the Document does not "require"
people to register, but only "encourages" them to do so, although
registration can, in fact, save costs in the adjudication of software
disputes.59
The two articles in Document No. 18, nonetheless, had the ef-
fect of strengthening the protection for software developers. Arti-
cle 33 provides that "any entity shall not use any software product
in its computer system without authorization." 60 This seems to
place a strict liability on the end-users of computer software. But it
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art.
10, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 320
(1994).
56 A local software developer's computer program, as a "non-literary work,"
was "required" to register to receive protection under the Regulations for Com-
puter Software Protection, which provided in Article 24 that:
The registration of the copyright in software with the body responsible
for software registration and administration shall be the condition for the
filing of a request for administrative intervention or the institution of le-
gal proceedings in a software right dispute. A registration certificate
granted by the body responsible for software registration and admini-
stration shall be the initial certification of the validity of the copyright in
the software or of the verification and confirmation of the facts stated in
the application for registration.
Regulations for the Protection of Computer Software, June 4, 1991, translated in
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 2000), [hereinafter Regula-
tions]. In practice, though, courts have not enforced such a stringent requirement.
Xu Chao, Recent Developments in Copyright Protection of Computer Software in China,
3 CHINA PATS. & TRADEMARKS 57 (2001).
57 Xu Chao, supra note 56, at 56.
58 Id.
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is worth noting that this may be in conflict with Article 32 of the
Regulations for the Protection of Computer Software ("Regulations"),
which provides, "Where the holder of software does not know or
has no reasonable means of knowing that the software is an in-
fringing object [upon an existing copyright], liability for the in-
fringement shall be borne by the supplier of the infringing soft-
ware." 61 One of the main concerns of foreign software firms is that
the Chinese government may not place strict liability on end-users
of software programs.62
In addition, it seems that the characterization "end-users" does
not include individuals because, according to Xu Chao, the "end-
user" or "any entity," means the entity that purchases the software
for use in its production, sale, or other operational transactions, but
not for reproduction and distribution of such software.63 There-
fore, some Chinese scholars argue that under Document No. 18, all
individual (and family) end-users should be exempted from in-
fringement liability.64 The cases in the next section illustrate that
the ambiguities and inconsistent provisions embedded in Chinese
legislation concerning software end-user liability have been, and
will continue to be, the main cause of software disputes.
Document No. 18 also specifically requires all government bod-
ies related to I rights enforcement to intensify the crackdown
campaign on software piracy.65 To implement the Document, the
61 Regulations, supra note 56, art. 32.
62 See Spierer, supra note 14, at 47 (explaining the loophole left by Article 32 of
the Computer Software Protection Regulations for the Chinese Government in
terms of imposing strict-liability on end-users). See also Sun, supra note 2, at 5
(stating that the only official interpretation of Article 32 provides that end-users
should not be targeted for IP infringement violations).
63 Xu Chao, supra note 56, at 58.
64 Shou Bu, Ruanjian Qinquan Ruhe Jueding: Cong Weiruan Su Yadu an Shuoqi
[How to Determine Software Infringement: Comments on the Case of Microsoft v.
Yadu], JISUANJI SHIJIE RIBAO [CoMPUTERWORLD DAILY], Aug. 9, 1999, at A14-18,
available at http://www2.ccw.com.cn/99/9930/cin.asp.
65 Article 34 of the Document No.18 provides:
Efforts shall be intensified to crack down on software smuggling and pi-
rating, and to firmly investigate and punish acts of organized produc-
tion, manufacture and sale of pirating software. From the second half of
2000, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Information Indus-
try, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the
State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), the National Copyright Ad-
ministration (NCA) and the State General Office of Taxation shall jointly
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NCA issued Notice No. 1, further clarifying responsibilities of
various government departments at different levels. For example,
for general administrative penalty cases, local goverrvxnents have
jurisdiction over local cases, while the NCA has jurisdiction over
foreign-related cases. However, for software related cases, both lo-
cal governments and the NCA have jurisdiction. As to end-user
issues, the Notice urges all entities to use authentic software and
sets a timetable for compliance. If the entities continue to use pi-
rated software at the local level the NCA can issue warnings, order
software deleted, confiscate illicit income, impose fines of two to
five times the price of the authentic copy, or require some other
administrative sanction. 66 Whether these provisions are effective
or not remains to be seen, but they show an effort on the part of
government to combat software piracy.
5.2. Judicial and Administrative Enforcement
It is common knowledge that although China has extensive leg-
islation, it has a poor record when it comes to law enforcement.
According to Maria Lin, a lawyer at Morgan & Finnegan, "While
China has many laws to protect intellectual property,... enforce-
ment of such laws has been problematic as the court system is still
in the process of reform, and relevant administrative bureaus have
problems delegating authority." 67 However, others are more posi-
tive and optimistic about the enforcement situation in China. For
example, many foreign companies surveyed said that they are
happy with the performance of local Administration of Industry
and Commerce officials responsible for cracking down on piracy
because "[t]hey can raid almost immediately and.., we had about
95% success which is very high by any standard." 68 As for the
Chinese courts, while there are many complaints, especially about
evidence gathering, some foreign companies describe them as
"very efficient" if you "work within the system." 69
launch special campaign, on a regular basis, to crack down on software
piracy.
Xu Chao, supra note 56, at 56.
66 Id. at 59.
67 Harvard Asia Business Conference, supra note 49.
68 TACKABERRY, supra note 10, at 42.
69 Id. at 43.
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The following statistics and cases may shed some light on the
real status of IP law enforcement in China. "In March 1992, Chi-
nese authorities raided the Shenzhen Reflective Materials Institute,
and found 650,000 Microsoft holograms for use in pirated copies of
Microsoft software."70 The court found that the defendant had in-
fringed on Microsoft's rights and imposed a fine of U.S. $260.71 In
Business Software Alliance v. Beijing Ju Ren Computer, the Beijing No.
1 Intermediate Court issued a judgment on April 1, 1996, ordering
the defendant to pay the Business Software Alliance ("BSA") over
RMB 600,000 (U.S. $70,000) in damages, and ordered law enforce-
ment officials to confiscate all computers and software seized dur-
ing the raid.72 In yet another case in which foreign software giants,
Microsoft, AutoDesk, and WordPerfect, sued Beijing Giant Com-
puter for software infringement, the plaintiffs were awarded a total
of U.S. $43,000 in damages.73 There was clearly a big leap in dam-
ages awarded in the latter two cases when compared to the first.
This shows, to some extent, the Chinese courts' commitment to
protect the IP rights of software owners, whether they are domestic
or foreign. The following two cases, on the other hand, demon-
strate that courts are still very cautious in deciding issues concern-
ing end-user violations.
When Pacific Unidata and Beijing Jingyan Electronics sued
Avon Products (Guangzhou) for infringing the copyright of their
computer software in 1996, it was called the first and biggest Chi-
nese lawsuit brought against a U.S. company over IP rights in-
fringement.74 The case was first decided by the NCA, which im-
posed a penalty on the defendant of RMB 490,000 (U.S. $59,250) in
May 1997. The Guangdong Higher Court then awarded the plain-
tiffs damages of U.S. $12 million in June 1998. Finally, the judicial
committee of China's Supreme People's Court ("SPC"') repealed
the verdict and retried the case in 1999. The SPC decision was in-
terpreted to mean that "end-users would not be held accountable
for copyright infringement," and that ordinary consumers would
70 Spierer, supra note 14, at 49.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 TACKABERRY, supra note 10, at 23.
74 China's First Lawsuit Against the U.S. over Intellectual Property,
CHINAONLINE, Nov. 3, 1999, at http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/legal
/NewsArchives/cs-protected/1999/december/C9102708-SS.doc.asp.
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not "have to pay damages a thousand times higher than the origi-
nal price of the goods they purchased."75
Microsoft Corporation (China), Ltd. v. Beijing Yadu Science and
Technology Group is another major case involving disputes between
U.S. and Chinese parties. On December 17, 1999, the Beijing No. 1
Intermediate Court summarily dismissed the plaintiff's case for
lack of sufficient evidence and claimed the defendant was not the
proper party.76 According to a commentator, "[b]y ruling on this
procedural ground, the court apparently avoided, at least for the
time being, the need to address the substantive and fundamental
question of the case, i.e., whether an end user of pirated software is
directly or indirectly liable for infringement under the current
copyright regime." 77
In addition to infringement cases, there are also cases regarding
other software program issues. For example, there was a case con-
cerning whether the defendant had breached a contract to design a
software program when the program could not meet the requested
specifications. A court in Guangzhou decided in 1998 that because
the program was not fully developed to the stage where it could be
handed over to the customer for use, the defendant breached the
agreement and was ordered to pay RMB 140,000 (U.S. $17,000) as
compensation to the plaintiff.78
Despite the above cases and countless statistics on successful
raids conducted by Chinese administrative authorities, people still
view enforcement problems as the main failure of the Chinese EP
system.79 The problems include, inter alia, inefficient and corrupt
courts, overlapping responsibilities and insufficient budgets for
administrative enforcement agencies, inadequate damages and
fines, and the requirement that plaintiffs establish the burden of
proof.80 In addition, while courts have been doing their best to
handle IP cases and often reach judgments favorable to plaintiffs,
75 Id.
76 See Sun, supra note 2, at 2 (setting out the facts and outcome of this case in
further detail).
77 Id. at 2.
78 China IP Express Team, News and Developments of Intellectual Property Pro-
tection & Enforcement in the Peoples (sic) Republic of China, CHINA IP EXPRESS, July 27,
2001 ("Software developer ordered to pay RMB 140,000 in compensation."), avail-
able at http://www.iprights.com/our-publications/chinaipexpress/ciex_77.asp
(last visited Nov. 20, 2001) (on file with author).
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ninety-five percent of IP owners still prefer administrative agencies
to courts in seeking redress.8' I will discuss the reasons why these
problems still plague China's IP regime in Section 7 of this Essay.
5.3. State Assistance
In July 1999, the Ministry of Finance and the State Tax Admini-
stration issued a notice adjusting the tax policy for the software in-
dustry within the Zhongguan Science and Technology District and
giving the industry preferential treatment on enterprise income tax
and value added tax (zhengzhishui), reducing the value added tax
from seventeen percent to six percent.82 This was due to the relent-
less lobbying effort of the software industry, and not because of a
government initiative.8 3 In addition, municipal governments are
also establishing special funds for software development and pro-
viding preferential bank loans and employee benefits to software
developers.84 Municipal governments are also investing heavily in
the establishment of software R&D districts or production areas




The domestic software firms have realized that they must
strengthen themselves technically and financially in order to com-
pete in the world market. There are some, although not many, suc-
cess stories among Chinese software firms. "SuDa2000" is a
software program that is used for remote designation.8 6 It has oc-
81 Id.
82 ZHONGGUO KEJI FAZHAN YANJiU BAOGAO YAJTUZU [CHINA SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT REsEARCH GROUP], supra note 35, at 70.
83 According to Scott Kennedy, "The larger software firms deserve a great
deal of the credit for finally persuading the government to enact the tax reduction.
Without their regular criticism, there would have been no incentive on the part of
government to make the changes." Kennedy, supra note 23, at 250.
84 ZHONGGUO KEJI FAZHAN YA JL BAOGAO YAJIUZU, [CHINA SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP], supra note 35, at 70.
85 For example, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen have established several
such districts such as the Zhongguan Science and Technology District, Beida
Qingniao, Shanghai Zhangjiang, and Shenzh Sai Bo Wei Er. Id.
86 Zhong Jian, supra note 32, at 11.
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cupied half of the Chinese market and has been voted the best
product in its class of software programs.8 7 The SuDa Corporation
planned to penetrate into industries including pharmaceuticals, car
parts, and real estate. The CEO of SuDa, Zhou Qixiong, attributed
the firm's success to the following three aspects: (1) high quality of
the software;8 8 (2) large-scale and good service;89 and (3) coopera-
tion with foreign companies.90 It has also been reported that King-
soft, a Chinese provider of office applications, recently released a
highly competitive software program called WPS Office 2002, a
word processing system expected to challenge Mficrosoft's Chinese-
language version of Office 2000.91
In addition to developing software on their own, the Chinese
software industry has also lobbied the Chinese government, along
with foreign software companies, to adopt policies to assist the in-
dustry. However, according to Scott Kennedy, the government is
probably more willing to adopt policies favoring industries that are




As Maskus has rightly pointed out, "In China, the domestic
software industry has grown rapidly in particular business appli-
cations that do not suffer much copying, but has faced obstacles in
developing larger and more fundamental program platforms.
Thus, domestic commercial interests in stronger copyrights are
now playing a role in promoting enforcement." 93 As the piracy
grows, the Chinese software firms have begun to fight for stronger
IP protection. Twelve Chinese software firms formed associations
87 Id.
88 SuDa has 600 software developers and, on average, can develop a new
program every three weeks. Id.
89 SuDa bought out Jiabei Corp. in Beijing and set up training and service
centers like "Xinyan Hope" and "Xinyan Lianbang." Id.
90 For example, SuDa's board of directors consists of people from Intel, IDG,
Intuit, etc. Id.
91 ChinaBiz.org, Local Software Competes with Microsoft for Government Con-
tracts, June 30, 2002, available at http://www.chinabiz.org/articles/show.asp?id
=1616.
92 Scott Kennedy, Between a Rock and a Soft Place: The Political Economy of
China's Software Sector, Remarks at the Asia/Pacific Research Center at Stanford
University (Apr. 29, 2002).
93 MASKUs, supra note 8, at 149.
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such as the China Software Alliance ("CSA") in March 1995 with
objectives similar to those of the international Business Software
Alliance. Their activities include, inter alia, promoting the industry
to consumers; facilitating business cooperation among software
companies; self-regulating; and representing their interests to the
government.94
For example, CSA successfully lobbied during NPC's legisla-
tive session to emphasize the importance of separate software pro-
tection regulations; they also convinced the NPC "to add clauses
that prohibit purchasers from trying to decipher software that
makers had encrypted to prevent piracy."95 For enforcement pur-
poses, CSA cooperated with BSA to operate a national hotline for
people to report piracy, and wrote newspaper articles to promote
public awareness of enforcement of IP laws.96 In addition to the
controls provided by CSA, larger local firms have also established
internal controls such as hiring IP attorneys to protect their own
copyrights and to plead their cases for greater protection against
piracy to the NPC.97
The software industry's campaign for greater software protec-
tion has, however, been limited by its small size and recent entry
into the economy.98 Therefore, China's software industry still has a
long way to go before gaining the influential and powerful status
of more traditional industries such as steel and electronics in China
and of the American software giant Microsoft. That said, its bot-
tom-up approach in promoting enforcement of IP rights does have
many positive implications for the rule of law in China, as I will
discuss in the following section.
7. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RULE OF LAW IN CHINA
As discussed above, in contrast to other Chinese industries, the
Chinese software industry is pushing for greater and stronger IP
94 Kennedy, supra note 23, at 254-55.
93 Id. at 257.
96 Id. at 254.
97 The heads of User Friend and Legend jointly issued a resolution on the pi-
racy issue to the second plenum of the Ninth NPC in March 1999. Id. at 255.
93 The software industry is particularly limited by its size and recent entry
into the economy when compared, for example, to the steel and electronics indus-
tries. The Chinese government and ordinary consumers are also not enthusiastic
about paying the higher prices for legal copies of software that would result un-
der a strengthened IP protection regime. Id. at 259.
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protection and it has achieved some impressive results with the
government's assistance. This raises the core issue of this Essay:
What are the implications of the trend towards greater protection
of software on the rule of law in China? Does the trend indicate
that the fate of rule of law in China will ultimately be decided by
economic forces or interests? As economic reform deepens, will
the Chinese people who have economic stakes in protecting their
own rights be more receptive to the rules governing their society,
making the rule of law more attainable in China? Does the case of
the software industry apply to other industries and to the rest of
Chinese society at large? In short, does the trend toward greater IP
protection in the Chinese software industry imply that China is in
transition from a society ruled by men (a pre-modern governance)
to a society ruled by law (modern governance)? 99
7.1. Economic Bird v. Legal Bird
Stanley Lubman observed that, "[In China] the economic bird
has already escaped from its cage, the economic plan, but the legal
bird remains in its own cage, although it is stirring and the dimen-
sions of the cage may be changing." 100 Professor Lubman's conser-
vative assessment of the legal development in China is based on
his deep understanding of the Chinese party-state system. 101 He
explained:
The doctrine that the current leadership espouses, which
urges replacement of the "rule of man" by the "rule of
law," implies that the relations between state and Party
must change and that the CCP must surrender at least some
of its authority to law. Whether that transformation can oc-
cur and, if so, how, is at the moment unclear.10 2
99 This is the question repeatedly posed by Professor Thomas C. Heller.
Thomas C. Heller, Practicing International Law: Legal Uncertainty and Business
Transactions in Developing Economies, Lecture at Stanford Law School (Spring
2002).
100 STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 2
(Stanford University Press 1999).
101 Id. at 3.
102 Id. at 5.
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His observation touched on the root of the problems embedded
in Chinese legal development: law plays a secondary role to the
Party in governing the society. Under the Party's absolute author-
ity, the independence of the judiciary has been compromised;
judges' roles blurred; judicial corruption widespread; and local
protectionism has flourished.03 These problems have, directly or
indirectly, led to the problems that plague the software industry,
such as ineffective enforcement of IP laws, rampant piracy of soft-
ware products, and distrust of courts in solving software disputes
among software owners. While insightful, Professor Lubman's as-
sessment may be too pessimistic. According to Professor Lubman,
China does not yet have a legal "system," but merely a cluster of
legal institutions.104 It is therefore not even qualified for Fuller's
"thin" theory of rule of law.105
From the discussion throughout this Essay, however, it is clear
that some forms of rule of law (or at least a "legal system") do exist
in China, although they may not meet the liberal democratic ver-
sion of rule of law which, according to Randall Peerenboom, "re-
fers to a system in which law imposes meaningful limits on the
state and individual members of the ruling elite, as captured in the
notions of a government of laws, the supremacy of the law and
equality of all before the law."'106 The form of rule of law in China
will be analyzed not only in the political context but also in the so-
cial and economic contexts. The trend of the Chinese software in-
dustry's pushing for greater legal protection demonstrates that it
will take some time for the software industry to be fully aware of
the importance of IP protection and that economic incentives do
play a large role in promoting consciousness of IP rights. The U.S.
experience proves this. Before the 1980s, most U.S. software com-
panies had a "casual view" of IP protection, and "[t]he view that
software should be given away was not uncommon in the indus-
try."'107 Since the 1980s, however, the U.S. trend has changed.
"[E]ven the onetime 'pirates' became zealous guardians of their in-
103 Id. at 2-5.
104 Id. at 3.
105 For further discussion of "thin" and "thick" theories of rule of law, see
Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249 (2001).
106 Id. at 282.
107 Teran, supra note 9, at 30.
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
tellectual property, particularly when their revenues dropped, as
suggested by the experience of Apple."
0 8
The definition of rule of law has therefore changed over the
past fifty years and we may now have to view rule of law in rela-
tion to the stage of development, to specific areas of governance, or
even to particular property rights (e.g., IP rights). According to
Professor Heller, rule of law is an evolving and spreading dis-
course that is, more than ever before, multifaceted and particular in
relation to specific areas of law, such as property and corporate
governance, and that now covers more things including, for exam-
ple, human rights.10 9 It is too simplistic to view China (or Asia at
large) as operating under a fundamentally different regime from
the West in terms of governance without taking the country's stage
of development into consideration."
0 Weber's 1947 conclusion that
a rational market requires rational law to govern is still applicable
to China, despite the fact that some parts of the Chinese economy
are thriving in a less than ideal legal environment."' The experi-
ence of the Chinese software industry in seeking stronger protec-
tion to strengthen its competitiveness proved that, "as business
transactions become more complex and, in particular, as they be-
come more internationally integrated, a transparent, impartially
administered, legal framework might be crucial.""
2 This should be
applicable to China's other industrial and commercial sectors as
well, although with some variations. It gives us some perspectives
for the future development of rule of law in China. When more
industries and commercial sectors reach the stage of the software
industry, there will be more demand for rule of law in China.
7.2. Incentives for Enforcement
Another issue relating to rule of law is the incentives for en-
forcement of laws. According to Dr. Peter Feng, there are incen-
108 Id. at 31.
109 Heller, supra note 99.
110 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, EMERGING ASIA: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 
34-
35 (1997).
111 Carol Jones pointed out that the remarkable economic successes of Singa-
pore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea suggest that Weber's theory may be
flawed, at least as it relates to Chinese societies. See Carol A.G. Jones, Capitalism,
Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change in China, in 3
Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 195 (1994).
112 EMERGING ASIA, supra note 110, at 35.
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lives to enforce laws, as well as incentives to break laws; currently
enforcement is weak and the incentives to break laws are high (e.g.,
readily available illegal imitations, and prohibitively expensive le-
gal products). Feng predicts that only when China becomes an IP
exporter will the Chinese have enough incentives to enforce IP
laws.113 This is true in most developing countries. As Teran ar-
gues, since the "enforcement priority" of enforcing the rights of the
software industry is lower as compared to other industries, gov-
ernments in developing countries protect software only "to avoid
U.S. trade sanctions, or to obtain a favorable U.S. response to a pol-
icy initiative.... [T]hese incentives are short lived and lead to an
inconsistent pattern of improvements in intellectual property pro-
tection."114 The situation can be changed only "if developing coun-
tries believe that enforcement of intellectual property rights will
stimulate their local software industries.""15
The situation in China relating to the software industry demon-
strated that the incentives on the government side are still primar-
ily to please the West, and especially the United States, while on
the software industry side, the protection of EP rights has become a
matter of life or death. The activities of software associations have
been instrumental in encouraging communications between the
two sides in hopes of bringing them together.
Using private and independent associations to communicate
the industry's policy objectives to the government is another im-
provement from the rule of law perspective. Scott Kennedy argues
that, unlike other industries in China, the relationship between the
government and the software industry has been pushing in the di-
rection of "pluralism." The "clientelism" or the utility of "guanxi"
is in decline. This change has been evidenced by software associa-
tions' independence and activism on behalf of their members, as
well as their direct ties to policy matters and their increased trans-
parency.116 The change in importance of personal ties to organized
communication in the relationship between government and cor-
porations indicates, to some extent, that some parts of Chinese so-
ciety, or at least specifically, the governance of the software indus-
try, are transforming from a "pre-modern governance" model to a
113 Harvard Asia Business Conference, supra note 49.
114 Teran, supra note 9, at 35.
115 Id. at 33.
116 Kennedy, supra note 23, at 215-16.
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"modem (or western) governance" model, as Professor Heller's
chart demonstrates."1
7
7.3. What Can Foreigners Do to Help?
Alford points out that the U.S. government has treated the
question of China's respect for American IP as a matter of "political
will, not ability," and imposed sanctions whenever IP-related trade
disputes arose between the two nations, only to find that Chinese
leaders' will to improve IP protection under U.S. threats of sanc-
tion often resulted in more widespread piracy." 8 In his view, the
U.S. government has ignored the historical, social, and economic
background of Chinese disrespect for IP rights, undermining ordi-
nary Chinese people's interests in IP protection. For example, Chi-
nese software developers' "dependence on their domestic market
makes them far more vulnerable to piracy than their American
counterparts in China."" 9 Afford's view is echoed by Oksenberg,
Potter, and Abnett who rightly stated, "Over the long run, provid-
ing incentives to Chinese firms and changing the norms (values,
beliefs, rules, and structures) that determine Chinese behavior are
more effective for eliciting cooperation than the threat and exercise
of punishment, although the latter is occasionally necessary in or-
der to make the former credible." 120
How can western countries help improve China's incentives to
enforce IP laws? Teran suggests they "take steps in this direction
by providing assistance to local software suppliers to defend their
intellectual property rights and develop associations of software
suppliers."121 Microsoft has set a good example in this respect.
[It] invests heavily in such projects as Guangdong Educa-
tion and Research Network and the China Education and
Research Network, [and] has donated hundreds of NT
117 Thomas C. Heller, Chart: Rule of Law Transition, Reader for Practicing
International Law (Spring 2002) (on file with author) (describing the rule of law
transition from pre-modem governance (driven by economics) to modem govern-
ance (driven by constitutional structure)).
118 Alford, supra note 47, at 149-50.
119 Id. at 154.
120 MICHEL OKSENBERG, PITMAN POTTER, & WILLIAM ABNETr, ADVANCING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THE COURSE OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 6 (1996).
121 Teran, supra note 9, at 33.
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servers, MS Chinese Office and Windows 95 packages to
Chinese organizations. Microsoft has also invested in four
training centers in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and
has decided to make it easier for original equipment manu-
facturers to license the MS operating system software.
These measures have helped consolidate the positions of
MS DOS and MS Windows as the preferred operating sys-
tems.122
Microsoft's move has certainly resulted in a win-win situation.
8. CONCLUSION
Although still in its infancy, the Chinese software industry has
demonstrated sufficient economic incentives for greater EP protec-
tion for its products. Mainly through private associations, the in-
dustry has pushed the government to provide more legislative as-
sistance, law enforcement, and financial support. This, in turn, has
pushed rule of law in China in a specific area. Although the soft-
ware industry is distinct from other industries, its bottom-up ap-
proach demonstrates that some systems of rule of law can be
achieved through the efforts of ordinary citizens and corporations.
The software industry's experience also illustrates that the concept
of rule of law is changing. When considering whether a country
has rule of law, it is necessary to examine not only the political con-
text, but also the economic development context, and sometimes
even the context of particular property rights, such as IP rights.
With this broad approach in mind, I believe that one can be more
optimistic about the overall development of rule of law in China.
122 Spierer, supra note 14, at 7.
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